PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUJIMORIST GOVERNMENT: A VIEW FROM THE PERIPHERY

Efraín Gonzales de Olarte

The incoming government of Keiko Fujimori shares several characteristics with her father Alberto Fujimori’s first term (1992-2000). First, the next president will have almost total control of the state apparatus, with the exception of the judiciary and a Congress without an absolute majority, where she will have to negotiate. In other words, a government with a high concentration of power and likely authoritarian tendencies is anticipated. Second, two-thirds of the country did not vote for her—just as happened with the approval of the 1993 Constitution, which was only approved by a third of the electorate—therefore, her legitimacy and popularity pose a significant problem for Ms. K and Fujimorism. How she addresses this weakness will give us an idea of ​​her political leanings (democracy, authoritarianism, or dictatorship). Third, he comes to power at a time when everyday violence has become Peru’s main social problem, its lethality approaching that of the terrorism of the 1990s. In other words, he will have to respond effectively, and the way he confronts it, if it includes the military, will resemble his father’s strategy, the results of which we know. Fourth, his rapprochement with the powers that be—the military, big business, and the media—will give him even more power, as it did for Alberto Fujimori.

However, there are several differences compared to his father’s decade in power. First, the economy has macroeconomic stability and a very comfortable financial situation that will perhaps allow for some growth policies, instead of the economic disaster left by Alan García’s government in 1990. However, 36 years into neoliberalism, the tax burden is very low, making it difficult to finance redistributive policies that would generate greater inclusion. Second, Peru is in the midst of the digital age, which has changed many things: access to more information, the use of technology for private and public purposes, and the rise of cell phone culture, with all its effects on the behavior of individuals and institutions. Now, politics and governance are conducted through digital means. Third, corruption is almost pervasive at various levels of the state and government, intertwined with illegal activities—mining, smuggling, drug trafficking, and logging in the Amazon rainforest—which constitutes either a challenge or an advantage, depending on the stance taken toward this problem. Obviously, corruption makes governing difficult. Fourth, the decentralization process, which her father abolished with the 1992 self-coup, is still underway. There is a risk that he will do the same.

This is, more or less, the context in which Keiko Fujimori’s government will have to govern. However, from the periphery, especially from the regions that voted for the leftist Roberto Sanchez, expectations are not necessarily optimistic, for several reasons. First, economic growth has failed to reduce inequality, and poverty—while reduced—remains a persistent problem. For them, the Fujimori economic model represents exclusion and contempt. Second, the structural adjustment of neoliberalism meant a reduction in the size of the state. Consequently, education and health services are insufficient and of poor quality. Furthermore, the privatization of public companies and the granting of concessions for mining and gas sites have not contributed to the well-being of these populations and many other regions. Third, they feel that any government led by “people like them” (Pedro Castillo or Roberto Sánchez), provincial and of mixed race, is rejected by urban elites, especially in Lima. And Ms. K is considered a Lima native, centralist, and undemocratic.

In other words, Peru is segmented, a dual country, and the challenge for the next government will be: how can its policies include these inhabitants of the periphery in the benefits of growth? How can the state provide them with better public services? And how can the economy integrate them through formal employment? This will only be possible with populist policies, just as his father implemented. Consequently, for businesses, there will be a stable macroeconomic policy with low taxes, while for the general population, there will be low-level social policies given the available fiscal resources. This is the governance formula applied by Alberto Fujimori, with the showed above results.

From the anti-Fujimori periphery, expectations range from the possibility of greater attention to their needs and demands, which will certainly mean an exacerbated and likely accepted populism for a large part of the population living in exclusion and poverty. There is, however, the possibility of a hardening of the national government’s stance, leading to social and regional polarization. In this scenario, regional and municipal governments may clash with the central government, given the anti-Fujimorism, especially since—given the concentration of power by the incoming president—decentralized governments could act as a political counterweight with demands that could put her to the test.

This situation actually opens up a great opportunity to act from the periphery. In a polarized country with a government that must respond to the needs of two-thirds of the population who lack genuine representation, the possibilities of influencing the search for solutions originating from the regions, provinces, and districts are quite open, provided certain conditions are met. First, it will be necessary for regional and local democratic forces to coordinate and develop proposals regarding the needs for productive investment and increased and improved social spending. This requires both institutional and personal leadership. Second, it is essential to propose the relaunch and rethinking of decentralization “from the bottom up” as a “state policy” around which a work agenda can be established to promote regional productive sectors (agro-exports, regional industries with higher added value, roads, energy, inbound and experiential tourism, etc.), that is, to try to deconcentrate the Peruvian economy, which is so concentrated in Lima, the coast, and the large cities. Then, improvements should be made to social programs, greater participation of businesses, institutions, and citizens, and a commitment to decentralization for regional and local development, from the periphery. Until now, decentralization has been carried out from the top down, from the center.

Consequently, a new phase will begin on July 28th, in which the new president’s need to govern for the entire country and the need to change the authoritarian image inherited from her father—well-cultivated since 2016—could generate an atmosphere of dialogue and, hopefully, lead to the establishment of policies whose objectives are: promoting the development of neglected regions and localities, decentralizing economic activity outside of Lima in sectors that promote employment and higher value-added, and ensuring the minimum inclusion of rural areas in the goods and labor markets. In other words, promoting policies whose fundamental objective is the common good of all Peruvians. Is it possible to expect this from Keiko Fujimori’s government? We wait to see.

Lima, July 2026