

Hybrid Regimes or Regimes in Transition?



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It is well known that the principal macropolitical phenomenon of the last half century or thereabouts has been democratisation, that is, the transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes in various parts of the world, from Southern Europe to Latin America and from Eastern Europe to many areas of Asia and Africa. Throughout the same period, literature on this topic has become predominant in the field of comparative politics. In more recent times, the growth of democratisation and the development of associated research has aroused considerable interest in the more specific theme of the spread of hybrid or 'transitional' regimes. As a result, the view of Croissant and Merkel that "partial types of democracy are the dominant trend in democratic theory and democratisation studies" comes as no surprise.¹ Neither does the assertion by Epstein and colleagues that 'partial democracies' "account for an increasing portion of current regimes and the lion's share of regime transitions", though they add that there is little available information about "what prevents full democracies from sliding back to partial democracies or autocracies, and what prevents partial democracies from sliding back to autocracy" and that "the determinants of the behaviour of the partial democracies elude our understanding".² It is no surprise either that such a variety of labels have been coined for these regimes by different authors: 'semi-consolidated democracies', 'hybrid regimes' (in the strict sense of the term), 'semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes' (Freedom House);³ 'partial democracies' (Epstein et al.); 'electoral democracies' (Diamond); 'illiberal democracies' (Zakaria); 'defective democracies' (Croissant and Merkel); 'competitive authoritarianisms' (Levitsky and Way); 'semi-authoritarianisms' (Ottaway); and 'electoral authoritarianisms' (Schedler). These are just some of many the expressions used by scholars investigating the phenomenon that will henceforth be referred to in this paper with the broader term of *hybrid regimes*.

To gain a better understanding of the reasons for such attention, it is worth bearing in mind that complex phenomena such as democratisation are never linear, and cases of a return to more ambiguous situations have by no means been an exception to the rule in recent years. Nonetheless, instances of democracies - even if minimal ones - going *all* the way back to stable authoritarian regimes have been much less frequent,⁴ as it is more difficult, albeit still possible, to recreate conditions of stable coercion once the majority of a given society has been involved and become politically active in the course of transition. If nothing else, as Dahl noted many years ago, greater coercive resources would be required.⁵ Furthermore, in periods of democratisation, authoritarian crises and the ensuing initial phases of change should be more frequent, even if only as the result of an imitation effect. Consequently, regimes characterised by uncertainty and transition - that is, hybrid regimes - become more frequent. So, if the goal is to examine and explain how regimes move towards democracy, it is fully justified, indeed opportune, to focus on phases of uncertainty and change.

This paper will outline the quantitative terms of democratisation; pinpoint the pertinent analytic dimensions, starting with definitions of the terms 'regime', 'authoritarianism' and 'democracy'; propose a typology of hybrid regimes; and, finally, attempt to answer the key question posed in the title. As will become clear, this question is not only closely bound up with prospects for change in the nations that have such ambiguous forms of political organisation, but also, more generally, with the spread of democratisation. In so doing, this paper will reach a number of unexpected conclusions.

¹ Croissant and Merkel, "Introduction: Democratization in the Early Twenty-First Century", special issue on "Consolidated or Defective Democracy? Problems of Regime Change", *Democratization* 11(5), 2004, pp.1-9 (p.1)

² Epstein et al, "Democratic Transitions", *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3), 2006, pp. 551-569 (p.556 and pp.564-5)

³ For this reference, simply see: www.freedomhouse.org

⁴ See below for more on the meaning of the terms as used here.

⁵ Dahl, *Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971

A widespread phenomenon?

The simplest and most immediate way of understanding the nature of the phenomenon in question is to refer to the principal sets of macropolitical data in existing literature. Data has been gathered by international bodies like the World Bank, the OECD and the United Nations; by private foundations such as the IDEA and Bertelsman Stiftung; by individual scholars or research groups like Polity IV (originally conceived by Ted Gurr) or Todd Landman, who formulated indicators of democracy and good governance, and also produced an effective survey of various initiatives in this field;⁶ and even by prominent magazines like the *Economist*, whose Intelligence Unit has drawn up an index of democracy. However, it is not necessary to refer to all of these here, as in spite of all its widely-discussed limitations and problems, the data provided by Freedom House has the insuperable advantage of being the result of over thirty years of experience and the product of a very extensive network of evaluators, which is updated on an annual basis. This particular data can therefore be used to begin to get a grasp of the phenomenon.

Table 1 features 58 out of 193 nations, which account for 30 percent of the world's population and have independent political regimes that can be defined as partially free - the concrete term closest to the notion of hybrid regimes.⁷ It should be remembered that Freedom House adopts a reverse points system: a score of one corresponds to the greatest degree of democracy in terms of political rights and civil liberties, while seven corresponds to the most repressive forms of authoritarianism with regard to rights and freedom. Partially free regimes have an

⁶ Landman, "Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance", Human Rights Center, University of Essex, 2003; *Protecting Human Rights. A Comparative Study*, Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2005

⁷ See below for necessary and more specific definitions.

Table 1: Partially free political regimes, 2007

Country	PR	CL
Afghanistan	5	5
<i>Albania</i>	3	3
Armenia	5	4
Bahrain	5	5
<i>Bangladesh</i>	4	4
<i>Bolivia</i>	3	3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3	3
Burkina Faso	5	3
<i>Burundi</i>	4	5
<i>Central African Republic*</i>	5	4
<i>Colombia*</i>	3	3
<i>Comoros*</i>	3	4
Djibouti	5	5
<i>East Timor*</i>	3	4
<i>Ecuador*</i>	3	3
Ethiopia	5	5
Fiji	6	4
Gabon	6	4
The Gambia	5	4
<i>Georgia*</i>	3	3
<i>Guatemala*</i>	3	4
<i>Guinea-Bissau*</i>	4	4
<i>Haiti*</i>	4	5
<i>Honduras*</i>	3	3
Jordan	5	4
<i>Kenya*</i>	3	3
Kuwait	4	4
Kyrgyzstan	5	4
Lebanon	5	4
<i>Liberia*</i>	3	4
<i>Macedonia*</i>	3	3
<i>Madagascar*</i>	4	3
<i>Malawi*</i>	4	3
Malaysia	4	4
Mauritania	5	4
<i>Moldova*</i>	3	4
<i>Montenegro*</i>	3	3
Morocco	5	4
<i>Mozambique*</i>	3	4
Nepal	5	4
<i>Nicaragua*</i>	3	3
<i>Niger*</i>	3	3
Nigeria	4	4
<i>Papua New Guinea*</i>	3	3
<i>Paraguay*</i>	3	3
<i>Philippines*</i>	3	3
<i>Seychelles*</i>	3	3
<i>Sierra Leone*</i>	4	3
Singapore	5	4
Solomon Islands	4	3
<i>Sri Lanka*</i>	4	4
Tanzania	4	3
Tonga	5	3
<i>Turkey*</i>	3	3
Uganda	5	4
<i>Venezuela*</i>	4	4
Yemen	5	5
<i>Zambia*</i>	3	4

Note: PR and CL stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results. The ratings reflect global events from December 1, 2005, through to December 31, 2006. The countries listed in italics with an asterisk are electoral democracies. Source: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, 2007 Edition.

overall rating ranging from three to five.⁸ Such regimes are obviously present in every continent: there are five in Europe (four of which are in the Balkans); 23 in Africa; 17 in Asia (six of which are in the Middle East); nine in the Americas (five in South America and four in Central America); and four in Oceania. There are 45 non-free regimes, which might be defined as stable authoritarianisms and which correspond to 23 percent of the population,⁹ and 90 democracies, amounting to 47 percent of the world's population. Overall, then, the partially free regimes exceed the non-free ones both in number and in terms of the percentage of the population accounted for. One further observation is that, with a few exceptions such as Turkey,¹⁰ most of the nations that fall within the 'partially free' category are medium-small or small. Finally, from a European point of view, despite the intense efforts of the European Union, other international organisations and specific European governments, almost none of the Balkan nations has embraced democracy, apart from Slovenia and Croatia. Serbia is very much a borderline case, while Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia (which has even applied to join the European Union) and Montenegro are partially free regimes. The other European nation in the same situation is Moldova, which borders onto Romania and Ukraine. As for the latter, it is considered to be a 'free' country and should have reasonable prospects of becoming a full democracy. However, before proceeding any further with our empirical analysis, it is necessary to define some terms, which will hopefully help to give greater precision to the current rather approximate terminology.

⁸ The electoral democracies need to be distinguished amongst these. For more on the definition thereof, see below.

⁹ As is known, about half of this population lives in a single nation, China.

¹⁰ The inclusion of Turkey in this group of countries has already prompted debate, and other analysts, especially Turkish scholars, place it amongst the minimal democracies, stressing the great and now long-standing fairness of the electoral procedure, for which Freedom House does not award the maximum rating.

Which analytic dimensions?

An adequate conceptualisation of the notion of a 'hybrid regime' must start with a definition of both the noun and the adjective thus combined to describe a form of government effectively "trapped" between a non-democratic set-up (particularly in the sense of being traditional, authoritarian and post-totalitarian) and a democratic one. With regard to the term 'regime', consideration will be given here to "the set of government institutions and norms that are either formalised or are informally recognised as existing in a given territory and with respect to a given population."¹¹ Emphasis will be placed on the institutions, even if they are not formal, that exist at a given moment in a given nation. While they no longer belong to some kind of non-democracy, but do not yet form a complete democracy, such institutions still bear traces of the previous political reality.

The second point that can be established, then, is that the type of regime in question does not fulfil the minimum requirements of a democracy - in other words, it does not meet all the more immediately controllable and empirically essential conditions that make it possible to establish a *threshold* below which a regime cannot be considered democratic. A minimal definition can be established whereby all regimes that have at least the following should be regarded as democratic: *a)* universal suffrage, both male and female; *b)* free, competitive, recurrent and fair elections; *c)* more than one party; *d)* different and alternative media sources. To better understand this definition, it is worth stressing that in a regime of this kind, there must be a real guarantee of civil and

¹¹ A more complex definition is offered by some scholars, including O'Donnell, who suggests considering the patterns, explicit or otherwise, that determine the channels of access to the main government positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted or excluded from such access, and the resources or strategies that they can use to gain access. An empirically simpler line is adopted here, which is based on the old definition by Easton (*A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York, Wiley, 1965).

political rights. Such rights are assumed to exist subject to the following conditions: firstly, there must be authentic universal suffrage, which constitutes the supreme expression of political rights - that is, the whole adult *demos* has the right to vote; secondly, there must be free, fair and recurrent elections as an expression of the veritable existence of freedom of speech and thought; thirdly, there needs to be more than one effectively competing party, demonstrating the existence of a genuine right of association; and fourthly, there must be different media sources belonging to different proprietors, thus providing proof of the existence of the above-mentioned liberties.

One important aspect of this definition is that, if just one of these requirements is not met, or at some point ceases to be so, then the regime in question is no longer democratic. Rather, it constitutes some other political and institutional set-up, possibly an intermediate one marked by varying degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity. Finally, it is worth stressing that this minimal definition focuses on the institutions that characterise democracy: elections, competing parties (at least potentially so), and media pluralism. Another point to note is that it is also important, according to Schmitter and Karl, that these institutions and rights should not be subject to, or conditioned by, 'non-elected actors' or exponents of other external regimes.¹² The former refers to the armed forces, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, a hegemonic party or even a monarch with pretensions to influencing decision-making processes, or at least the overall functioning of a democracy; in the second case, a regime might be conditioned by an external power that deprives the democracy in question of its independence and sovereignty by pursuing non-democratic policies.

To avoid terminological confusion, it should be pointed out that we are not in the ambit of the electoral democracies defined by Diamond solely with regard to "constitutional systems in which parliament and

executive are the result of regular, competitive, multi-party elections with universal suffrage".¹³ Instead, we are referring to his notion of minimal liberal democracies, in which there is no room for "reserved domains" of actors who are not electorally responsible, directly or indirectly; in which there is inter-institutional accountability - that is, the responsibility of one organ towards another as laid down by the constitution; and finally, in which there are effectively applied norms to sustain and preserve pluralism and individual and group freedoms.¹⁴ The term 'electoral democracies' is also used by Freedom House with a similar meaning: an electoral democracy is understood as a multi-party, competitive system with universal suffrage, fair and competitive elections with the guarantee of a secret ballot and voter safety, access to the media on the part of the principal parties and open electoral campaigns. According to the application of the term by Freedom House, all democracies are 'electoral democracies', but not all are liberal. Therefore, even those regimes that do not have a maximum score in the indicators for elections continue to be considered electoral democracies. More specifically, a score equal to or above seven, out of a maximum of twelve, is sufficient for partially free nations to be classified as electoral democracies (see Table 1).¹⁵

As regards the definition of non-democratic regimes, reference must at least be made to traditional and authoritarian regimes. The former are "based on the personal power of the sovereign, who binds his underlings in a relationship of fear and reward; they are typically *legibus soluti* regimes, where the sovereign's arbitrary decisions are not limited by norms and do not need to be justified ideologically. Power is thus used in particularistic forms and for essentially

¹³ Diamond, *Developing democracy: toward consolidation*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p.10

¹⁴ The other specific components of liberal democracies are delineated by Diamond in *Developing democracy: toward consolidation*, 1999, pp. 11-12

¹⁵ The three indicators pertaining to the electoral process are: 1. head of government and principal posts elected with free and fair elections; 2. parliaments elected with free and fair elections; 3. electoral laws and other significant norms, applied correctly (see the site of Freedom House).

¹² Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy is... and is Not", in Diamond and Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp.45-6

private ends. In these regimes, the armed forces and police play a central role, while there is an evident lack of any form of developed ideology and any structure of mass mobilisation, as usually occurs with a single party. Basically, then, the political set-up is dominated by traditional elites and institutions."¹⁶

As for authoritarian regimes, the definition advanced by Linz is still the most useful one: a "political system with limited, non-responsible political pluralism; without an elaborated and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities; without either extensive or intense political mobilisation, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader, or, occasionally, a small group, exercise power from within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable, limits".¹⁷ This definition permits the identification of five significant dimensions: firstly, the degree of *political pluralism*, which mainly concerns the political actors who determine the regime and its policies; secondly, the ideology, or rather, the ideological justification behind the regime; thirdly, the degree of participation and *political mobilisation*, once again regarding political society; fourthly, the presence and composition of the group that exercises power; fifth and lastly, the presence of ambiguous and *ill-defined* rules, which also point more generally to the nature of the rules and procedures adopted in the authoritarian regime.

However, the dimensions that are genuinely important for an understanding of non-democratic regimes are the first three mentioned. The fourth needs to be considered in relation to the first, in that it essentially specifies it, while the fifth may also relate to traditional regimes. A further, frequently neglected, but nonetheless important dimension should also be added and emphasised: the *institutional structure* of the regime, which is invariably of marked importance in many transitional cases. Once institutions have been

created and then become stable over a certain number of years, they often leave behind a significant legacy in a new regime, even when it has become firmly democratic.

In terms of the interaction between society and institutions, therefore, the most important aspect that needs to be considered is mobilisation - that is, the *quantum* of mass participation induced and controlled from above. Political society has no recognised autonomy or independence; in phases of greater stability, the rulers of a non-democratic regime will adopt policies designed to keep civil society outside the political arena. In any case, a certain degree of participation, albeit low, non-extensive and non-intense, may be desired and controlled from above. This situation has two implications at the regime level. Firstly, it implies the existence of efficient, repressive apparatuses capable of implementing the above-mentioned demobilisation policies - security services, for instance - which may be autonomous or part of the military structure. Secondly, it implies the partial weakness or the absence of mobilisation structures, such as the single party or similar state institutions - that is, structures capable of simultaneously generating and controlling participation. Obviously, there is also another implicit aspect that must not be forgotten: the absence of real guarantees regarding the various political and civil rights.

The degree of limited, non-responsible pluralism is also of central importance. This may range from monism to a certain number of crucial active actors in the regime. For every non-democratic regime, then, it is particularly important to pinpoint the significant actors. These can be divided into institutional actors and politically active social actors. Examples of the former are the army, the bureaucratic system or a part thereof and, where applicable, a single party; the latter include the Church, industrial or financial groups, landowners and, in some cases, even unions or transnational economic structures with a major interest in the nation concerned. Such actors are not politically responsible according to the typical mechanism of liberal democracies - that is, through

¹⁶ Morlino, *Democrazie e Democratizzazioni*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003, p.80

¹⁷ Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Spain", in Allardt and Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, Helsinki, Westermarck Society, 1964, 291-342 (p.255)

free, competitive and fair elections. If there is “responsibility”, it is exercised at the level of “invisible politics” in the real relations between, for instance, military leaders and economic groups or landowners. Furthermore, elections or the other forms of electoral participation that may exist, such as direct consultations through plebiscites, have no democratic significance and, above all, do not offer the expression of rights and freedoms and the genuine competition to be found in democratic regimes. They mainly have a symbolic, legitimating significance, an expression of consensus and support for the regime on the part of a controlled, non-autonomous civil society.

The notion of limited pluralism suggests the importance of identifying the pertinent actors in each authoritarian regime in order to better understand both the structure of the regime and the policies it pursues. It makes it possible, then, to refer to the concept of the *dominant coalition*. This term is understood in broad terms as the set of politically active social groups that support the regime as it is being established and in successive periods - in other words, groups that lie at the social core of the regime. The term is also understood in a more restricted sense as the elites - which constitute the direct or indirect expression of the afore-mentioned groups - that contribute to governing the regime itself in that they occupy positions of command in key structures of the authoritarian set-up. The point that deserves attention is that such groups, and the related elites, sometimes form an implicit, but nonetheless real coalition, while in others it is the result of an explicit, conscious agreement on concrete ways of resolving political conflicts - principally, for instance, with regard to class conflict and the specific issues associated with it. This agreement is to the advantage of the actors who form part of the coalition, and may exclude and marginalise all others, including peasants or workers who were previously active in political life to a greater or lesser degree by virtue of their membership of political parties or unions. Political marginalisation is achieved thanks to a combination of police repression and the use of the ideological apparatus adopted by the regime’s elites for their own legitimisation. Above all,

when it follows on from a democratic regime, the establishment of a non-democratic regime is often the result of a coalition that is “anti-something” rather than for something - in other words, it is a negative coalition. On the other hand, a coalition of this kind may be more homogeneous than a democratic one: even when there is no agreement on the (non-democratic) method, there is a consensus to reject certain types of fracture that existed in or were just prefigured in the previous regime, and sometimes in supporting certain solutions in a positive sense. Basically, then, when it is established, an authoritarian coalition may appear more homogeneous and more solid in that there is some substantive agreement, either in negative or positive terms, regarding the concrete settlement of conflicts. In any case, the homogeneity and solidity of the coalition increases in direct proportion to the breadth of agreement between the various actors with regard to substantive problems, and such agreement is in turn easier if certain ideologies, principles or values become prevalent in the governing coalition.

A very important role in defining the features and the concrete functioning of the dominant coalition may be played – and often is in quite concrete terms – by a leader who interacts with all the components of the coalition itself. He or she may do so by i) effectively acting as an arbitrator or mediator between different interests, or ii) favouring, more or less consciously and perhaps by making an ideological choice, certain interests over others, or, again iii) subordinating different interests to his or her power, while also using a variety of strategies to keep those interests bound together (personal loyalty ties, promises, forms of coercion, etc.).

A coalition is *dominant* in terms of coercive resources, influence and status, which are used concretely by the actors in the political arena to achieve their objectives. It is, then, dominant above all at the moment when the regime is established. This does not preclude the possibility that other resources of the same type may exist but are not employed at certain crucial moments. It should also be added that predominance in terms of

resources also entails consideration of the field of potential or real opponents to the regime and the coalition that supports it. As such, it is always a relative notion with respect to the resources employed in the political arena. Once a regime is established, the coalition may gradually undergo modification, either in the sense that minority players are marginalised, or in the sense that some actors acquire greater prominence over others in the wake of the events and developments that characterise the setting up of the regime, or due to the internal ramifications of external events.

The third characteristic concerns the degree of elaboration of the ideological justification for the regime. Certain authoritarian regimes are distinguished by the fact that they are legitimated on the basis of "mentality", according to the term borrowed from the German sociologist Geiger - that is, simply on the basis of a number of "mental" or "intellectual attitudes", of certain values (which may be more or less explicitly articulated or may remain ambiguous) around which it is easier to find an agreement between actors who have different inherent characteristics and often very divergent interests.¹⁸ These values include notions like homeland, nation, order, hierarchy and authority, where both traditional and modernising positions can, and sometimes have, found common ground. In any case, the regime is not supported by any complex, articulated ideological elaboration. In other regimes, like the traditional ones, the only effective justification for the regime is personal in nature - that is, to serve a certain leader, who may, in the case of a monarch who has acceded to power on a hereditary basis, be backed by tradition.

The fourth significant dimension concerns the political structures that are created and institutionalised in the non-democratic regime. What needs to be examined here is if, and to what extent, a given authoritarian regime creates and, perhaps, institutionalises characteristic new political structures. These may include a single party; unions (which may be vertical ones admitting both workers and employers); distinct

forms of parliamentary assembly, possibly based on the functional and corporative representation of interests (see below); distinctive electoral systems; military juntas; ad hoc constitutional organs; or other specific organs different from those that existed in the previous regime.¹⁹

Having established definitions for the types of regime bordering on the ones analysed here, it is now possible to start delineating *hybrid regimes* as those regimes that have acquired some of the characteristic institutions and procedures of democracy, but not others, and, at the same time, have either retained some authoritarian or traditional features, or lost some elements of democracy and acquired some authoritarian ones. To use expressions common in the Iberian world, we might talk, as certain Latin American scholars have done, of *dictablandas* and *democraduras*.²⁰ However, in defining hybrid regimes, it seems more appropriate to start from the context in which they originate. From this perspective, they can be said to be all those regimes preceded by a period of authoritarian or traditional rule, followed by the beginnings of greater tolerance, liberalisation and a partial relaxation of the restrictions on pluralism. Alternatively, they can be defined as all those regimes which, following a period of minimal democracy in the sense indicated above, see the intervention of non-elected bodies - the military, above all - which place restrictions on competitive pluralism without, however, creating a more or less stable authoritarian regime. There are, then, three possible hypotheses for a definition that takes account of the context of origin, which can be better explained as follows: the regime arises out of one of the different types of authoritarianism that have existed in recent decades, or even earlier; the regime arises out of a traditional

¹⁹ For another more recent analysis of non-democratic regimes, especially authoritarian ones, see Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes. Theory, Government & Politics*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000

²⁰ Rouquié, "L'Hypothèse 'Bonapartiste' et l'Émergence des Systèmes Politiques Semicompetitifs", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 25, 1975; O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Political Life After Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Transitions", in O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1986

¹⁸ Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol.3, *Macropolitical Theory*, edited by Nelson Polsky and Fred Greenstein, pp.175-411 (pp.266-269).

regime, a monarchy or sultanism; or the regime arises out of the crisis of a previous democracy. To these must be added a fourth, which is an important clarification of the second: the regime is the result of decolonisation that has never been followed by either authoritarian or democratic stabilisation.

If at least the first and second of these hypotheses are developed further – though the majority of cases in recent decades would seem to fall into the first category – it can be seen that alongside the old actors of the previous authoritarian or traditional regime, who form part of a coalition that is no longer dominant or united, a number of opposition groups have clearly taken root, thanks also to a partial, and relative, respect of civil rights. These groups are allowed to participate in the political process, but have little substantial possibility of governing. There are, then, a number of parties, one of which remains hegemonic and dominant in semi-competitive elections; at the same time, there is already some form of real competition amongst the candidates of the dominant party. The other parties are fairly unorganised, of recent creation or re-creation, and only have a small following. There is some degree of real participation, but it is minimal and usually limited to the election period. Often, a powerfully distorting electoral system allows the hegemonic, dominant party to maintain an enormous advantage in the distribution of seats; in many cases, the party in question is a bureaucratic structure rife with patronage favours, which is trying to survive the on-going transformation. This means that there is no longer any justification for the regime, not even merely on the basis of all-encompassing and ambiguous values. Other forms of participation during the authoritarian period, if there have ever been any, are just a memory of the past. Evident forms of police repression are also absent, and so the role of the relative apparatuses is not prominent, while the position of the armed forces is even more low key. Overall, there is little institutionalisation and, above all, organisation of the “state”, if not a full-blown process of de-institutionalisation. The armed forces may, however, maintain an evident political role, though it is still less explicit and direct.

In order to gain a better understanding of hybrid regimes, it is also worth noting that they often stem from the attempt, at least temporarily successful, by moderate governmental actors in the previous authoritarian or traditional regime to resist internal or external pressures on the dominant regime; to continue to maintain order and the previous distributive set-up; and to partially satisfy – or at least appear to – the demand for greater democratisation on the part of other actors, the participation of whom is also contained within limits. Potentially, there are as many different variants of transitional regimes as there are types of authoritarian and traditional models. Many cases could be fitted into this model, which says a good deal about their potential significance.

Many years ago, Finer seemed to have detected the existence of hybrid regimes when he analysed “façade democracies” and “quasi-democracies”.²¹ Looking more closely at these two models, however, it is clear that the former can be tied in with the category of traditional regimes, while the latter falls within the broader authoritarian genre. In fact, typical examples of “quasi-democracies” are considered to be Mexico – obviously prior to 1976 – and certain African nations with a one-party system. The notion of “pseudo-democracy” also refers not to a hybrid regime, but rather to instances of authoritarian regimes with certain exterior forms of the democratic regime. These include constitutions which claim to guarantee rights and free elections, but do not reflect an even partially democratic state of affairs. There is, then, no genuine respect for civil and political rights, and consequently no form of political competition either.

²¹ Finer, *Comparative Government*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970, pp.441-531

What kind of classification?

On the basis of the previous definition, then, a crucial element of hybrid regimes is the break-up of the limited pluralism and the dominant coalition pertaining to previous authoritarian or traditional regimes; or the introduction of limitations to an open, competitive pluralism where previously there had been a full democracy; or the prolonging of a situation of uncertainty when the country in question gains independence but does not have, or is unable to establish, its own autonomous institutions (authoritarian or democratic), and cannot revert to traditional institutions, since the latter have either disappeared or have been completely delegitimised. In all these hypotheses there are (or there emerge) veto players - that is, individual or collective actors who are influential or decisive in maintaining the regime in its characteristic state of ambiguity and uncertainty. These actors may be: an external, foreign power that interferes in the politics of the nation; a monarch or authoritarian ruler who has come to power by more or less violent means; the armed forces; a hegemonic party run by a small group or a single leader; religious hierarchies; economic oligarchies; other powerful groups; or a mixture of such actors, who are nonetheless either unable or unwilling to eliminate other pro-democratic actors, assuming that in the majority of current hybrid regimes the alternative is between democracy and non-democracy.²²

In the face of this variety in the origin and ambiguity of internal structures, the next step that is necessary to understand what effectively distinguishes these regimes (see Table 1) is to develop some kind of

typology. In abstract terms, three possible directions could be taken to achieve this goal: the drawing up of a classification based on the origins mentioned above, and therefore on the legacy of the previous regime; an examination of the processes of change undergone by the nations in question and the consequences for the institutional set-up that emerges; and a third line which, more 'simply', considers the result, that is, the distinguishing characteristics at a given point in time - for example, in 2007 - of those nations that fall within the genus of hybrid regimes. The objectives of the first possible typology would be more explicitly explanatory, focusing on the resistance of institutions to change; the second, albeit also serving an explanatory purpose, would be more attentive to how modes of change themselves help to define the kind of hybrid regime in question; the third would be chiefly descriptive and would start from the results, that is, from the characteristic traits of the regime. This third typology should thus provide a better grasp of the inherent variety of the regimes defined as hybrid. However, before going any further, it is essential to consider how the issue has been tackled by other authors in the past.

A suitable starting point - albeit not an exhaustive answer - is to cite the simplest solution, proposed by Freedom House, which took the third approach mentioned above. Using its own data, Freedom House broke down the ensemble of nations defined as 'partially free' into semi-consolidated democracies, transitional or hybrid regimes in the strict sense, and semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes. The first category is comprised of regimes with an average rating from 3.00 to 3.99; the second, of regimes whose average lies between 4.00 and 4.99; and the third, of regimes whose average lies between 5.00 and 5.99 (see Table 1). Croissant and Merkel also propose an interesting classification of 'defective democracies'. This category can be divided into 'exclusive democracies', which offer only limited guarantees with regard to political rights; 'domain democracies', in which powerful groups condition and limit the autonomy of elected leaders; and 'illiberal democracies', which only provide partial civil rights

²² For a more in-depth discussion of veto players in the ambit of hybrid regimes and in democratisation, see Morlino and Magen in "Methods of Influence, Layers of Impact, Cycles of Change: A Framework for Analysis" and "Scope, Depth and Limits of External Influence - Conclusions" in *Anchoring Democracy: External Influence on Domestic Rule of Law Development*, London, Routledge, forthcoming.

guarantees.²³ Finally, Diamond, who starts from the more general notion of the hybrid regime, as has been done here, proposes four categories on the basis of the degree of existing competition: hegemonic electoral authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, electoral democracy (see above) and a residual category of ambiguous regimes.²⁴ The regimes in three out of these four categories fail to provide the minimum guarantee of civil rights that would grant them the status of electoral democracies.²⁵ Starting from the basic fact that hybrid regimes no longer have some of the essential aspects of the non-democratic genre, but still do not have all the characteristics required to meet the minimum definition of democracy, Morlino formulated another classification of hybrid regimes.²⁶ First and foremost, if limits are placed by specific actors on people's true freedom to vote, or even on allowing dissent and opposition, and on the correct handling of the elections themselves, one can talk of a *protected democracy*. By this term it is understood that the regime being analysed – defined by Croissant and Merkel as a 'domain democracy'²⁷ – is controlled by military apparatuses or even by forces external to the country, which condition the regime; or, at any rate, that there are laws or unwritten laws that limit competition above all else, for example by prohibiting certain parties (e.g. the Communist Party) from presenting their own election candidates. On the other hand, one can talk of a *limited democracy* when there is male suffrage, a formally correct electoral procedure, elective posts occupied on the basis of those elections and a multi-party system, but civil rights are not guaranteed, there is no effective party-level

opposition, and, above all, the media are compromised by a situation of monopoly to the point that part of the population is effectively prevented from exercising their rights. The notion of 'illiberal democracy' advanced by Merkel coincides with that of limited democracy as presented here.²⁸

The main difference between the four proposals lies in the fact that, while also having explanatory objectives, the authors point to different factors as being the crucial elements for explaining what these regimes really are. Other authors could also be mentioned, but it would perhaps be best to stop here and to take stock. The first direction, labelled as explanatory, can be developed more fully and systematically if the hypothesis of institutional inertia is assumed in its entirety and what was sustained above is reformulated more clearly: the types of hybrid regimes that might come into being depend directly on the typologies of authoritarian regimes and democracies that have already been established. As evidenced in Figure 1, the core assumption of the typology is that traditional and democratic regimes can, by virtue of their characteristics, give rise to different results, while it is more likely that the survival of authoritarian veto players points towards a single solution, that of protected democracies. In any case, the elaboration of this classification or typology leads us to propose three possible classes: *protected democracy*, which has already been described above; *limited democracy*, also discussed; and a third, logically necessary one in which it is hypothesised that there are no legacies or powerful veto players as such, but just a situation of widespread illegality in which the state is incapable either of sustaining the kind of electoral process that distinguishes a full or liberal democracy or of adequately protecting civil rights, due to inadequately functioning, or inexistent, legal institutions. This third class can be defined as '*democracy without law*'.

²³ Croissant and Merkel, "Introduction: Democratization in the Early Twenty-First Century"

²⁴ Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes", *Journal of Democracy*, 2002, 13 (2): 25-31


²⁵ It should be noted that Diamond uses the term 'electoral democracy' with a different meaning to that of Freedom House, as has already been clarified above. For Diamond 'electoral democracy' and 'liberal democracy' are two different categories, while for Freedom House all liberal democracies are also electoral, but not vice versa. So, for example, according to Freedom House, a nation like the United Kingdom is a liberal democracy, but is also electoral, while for Diamond it is not.

²⁶ Morlino, *Democrazie e Democratizzazioni*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003, p.45

²⁷ Croissant and Merkel, "Formal Institutions and Informal Rules of Defensive Democracies", *Central European Political Science Review*, Vol.1, No.2, Dec 2000, pp.31-48

²⁸ Croissant and Merkel, "Formal Institutions and Informal Rules of Defensive Democracies", *Central European Political Science Review*, Vol.1, No.2, Dec 2000, pp.31-48

Fig. 1: What kind of hybrid regime?



The second perspective may be complementary to the first. If the context is one of regime change and there is a hybrid resulting from a process of transition during which the characteristics of the previous regime have disappeared (as mentioned above), starting with the break-up of the dominant coalition and the easing up of limitations on pluralism (the hypothesis here is obviously that of a transition from authoritarianism), it is necessary to see what process of change has started and how, in order to assess and predict its future course. The advantage of this classificatory perspective is that, given that the regimes in question are undergoing transformation, the direction and possible outcomes of such change can be seen more clearly. So, if there is *liberalisation*, with or without little resort to violence - that is, a process of granting more political and civil rights from above, never very extensive or complete but so as to enable the controlled organisation of society at both the elite and mass level -, what one has is an institutional hybrid that should permit an 'opening up' of the authoritarian regime, extending the social support base, and at the same time saving the governing groups or leaders already in power. The most probable result, then, would be a hybrid that can be defined as a protected democracy

that would, moreover, be capable of lasting for a considerable or very long time. In order to have some probability of stabilisation, such a political hybrid must be able to rely not only on the support of the institutional elites, both political and social, but also on the maintenance of limited mass participation (in other words, on the governing elite's capacity for repressing or dissuading participation) and on the limited attraction of the democratic model in the political culture of the country, especially amongst the elites.

Another possible scenario is the occurrence of a rupture as a result of a grassroots mobilisation of groups in society or of the armed forces, or due to foreign intervention. If it proves impossible to move towards a democratic situation, even if only slowly, due to the presence of antidemocratic veto players, then a more or less enduring situation, characterised by a lack of the guarantees regarding order and basic rights to be found in limited democracy, becomes a concrete possibility. In this dynamic perspective, the third solution, that of 'democracy without law', does not even entail liberalisation or the break-up of limited pluralism as such, in that there is no previously existing stable regime.

Table 2: Significant dimensions for an analysis of political regimes in partially free countries (2007)

Country	Rule of law	Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political pluralism and participation	Freedom of expression	Freedom of association and organisation	Autonomy and individual freedom
Afghanistan	3	6	4	7	5	5	5
Albania	10	8	7	11	11	8	9
Armenia	6	4	4	5	8	5	9
Bahrain	4	3	4	9	8	3	5
Bangladesh	6	8	4	10	8	8	9
Bolivia	8	11	4	13	15	11	9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	10	8	6	11	11	8	10
Burkina Faso	6	5	4	8	14	9	7
Burundi	4	9	4	9	8	5	6
Cent. Afr. Rep.	3	7	3	7	10	9	4
Colombia	7	10	7	9	12	7	10
Comoros	8	9	4	11	10	6	6
Djibouti	5	4	3	5	7	5	6
East Timor	6	11	5	10	11	7	9
Ecuador	5	9	4	15	15	11	10
Ethiopia	4	5	4	5	7	3	6
Fiji	7	0	2	5	10	4	10
Gabon	6	2	3	5	10	6	5
Gambia	7	6	4	7	10	6	8
Georgia	7	9	7	9	12	8	10
Guatemala	5	9	5	10	12	8	8
Guinea-Bissau	8	9	4	9	11	8	6
Guyana	8	11	7	13	15	10	9
Haiti	2	7	3	10	10	5	5
Honduras	7	9	6	10	13	8	9
Jordan	6	3	5	6	9	5	8
Kenya	8	9	5	11	14	9	8
Kuwait	7	4	6	9	9	6	5
Kyrgyzstan	5	5	4	7	10	8	7
Lebanon	5	4	5	8	12	8	9
Liberia	7	9	5	10	11	7	8
Macedonia	8	7	7	10	11	7	10
Madagascar	9	7	7	9	10	8	9
Malawi	9	7	6	10	11	8	7
Malaysia	6	6	6	7	8	6	9
Mauritania	6	6	4	7	10	8	5
Moldova	8	9	7	8	10	6	9
Montenegro	8	9	6	9	12	10	11
Morocco	6	4	6	7	8	6	8
Mozambique	7	7	7	11	11	7	8
Nicaragua	7	11	5	12	14	8	10
Niger	9	11	8	10	11	9	6
Nigeria	5	6	6	9	11	7	7
Papua N Guinea	7	9	6	11	12	9	8
Paraguay	7	11	4	11	12	8	10
Philippines	8	7	8	13	14	9	10
Seychelles	11	8	7	10	10	9	11
Sierra Leone	8	9	4	10	12	8	9
Singapore	8	4	7	6	9	3	12
Solomon Isl.	8	6	7	10	13	9	12
Sri Lanka	6	8	6	8	8	9	9
Tanzania	10	6	6	10	11	7	8
Tonga	11	3	3	9	12	5	12
Turkey	8	9	7	12	12	7	10
Uganda	7	4	4	7	11	6	7
Venezuela	5	8	4	8	11	7	8
Yemen	4	4	3	7	7	3	5
Zambia	8	8	6	11	11	8	7

Source: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, 2007 Edition.

However, a characteristic of these modes of classification is that they are a priori and do not include an empirical survey of the countries defined as hybrid regimes. In this respect, they fail to carry out one of the principal tasks of any classification, which is to examine all the empirical phenomena identified as hybrid regimes and then arrive at some form of simplification that makes it possible to grasp the phenomenon as a whole and its internal differences. So, do the three classificatory types outlined above hold up when the existing cases are compared? Looking at the Freedom House data and assuming that the regimes regarded as 'partially free' coincide with the notion of the hybrid regime developed here, the answer appears to be 'yes'. It is worth, above all, examining in greater detail the ratings of the countries belonging to that category on a set of indicators relating to seven ambits that are important when analysing any political regime, democratic or otherwise: rule of law, electoral process, functioning of

government, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and beliefs, freedom of association and organisation, personal autonomy and individual freedom.²⁹

On the basis of the profiles for each country, which can be pieced together from Table 2 and integrated with the notes provided by Freedom House, it emerges, as can be seen in Table 3, that the majority of hybrid regimes fall into one of the three categories delineated above. More specifically, the class of 'democracies without law' is formed by the first three ambits on Table 2 (rule of law, electoral process and state functioning); the protected democracy class is substantiated by the fourth ambit (pluralism and participation); and the limited democracies by the last three (freedom of expression and beliefs, freedom of association and organisation, individual autonomy and personal freedom). Each case was attributed to the category for which the country had the lowest relative rating.

Table 3: Classification and cases of hybrid regimes (2007)

Categories	Democracies without law	Protected democracies	Limited democracies
countries	Afghanistan Albania Bahrain Bangladesh Bolivia Burkina Faso Cent. Afr. Rep. Colombia Ecuador Georgia Guatemala Haiti Honduras Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Malawi Malaysia Montenegro Mozambique Nicaragua Nigeria Paraguay Philippines Solomon Isl. Sri Lanka Tanzania Tonga Uganda	Armenia Djibouti Ethiopia Fiji Gabon Jordan Morocco Singapore Venezuela	Burundi Comoros Gambia Guinea-Bissau Haiti Kuwait Mauritania Niger Turkey Yemen

²⁹ The macroindicators for each ambit are, for the rule of law: 1. independent judiciary; 2. application of civil and penal law and civilian control of the police; 3. protection of personal freedom, including that of

opponents, and absence of wars and revolts (civil order); 4. law equal for everyone, including the application thereof; for the electoral process: 1. head of government and principal posts elected with free and fair

Taking for granted that there could be errors, a certain approximation in analysing the cases, for which comprehensive, in-depth information other than the evaluations of Freedom House are not always available, and without wishing to be exhaustive, because any application of classifications to complex realities inevitably throws up mixed cases, the picture that emerges is still of great interest and has at least one evident and significant element. Ultimately, what counts in hybrid regimes is not so much the existence of a legacy or of veto players, but 'simply' a lack, which may be more or less marked, of *state*. Almost half the hybrid regimes are the result of an absence of institutions of some kind. In other words, there are no laws or they are not applied because the judiciary often has no effective independence,³⁰ the electoral process does not take place correctly, and there is widespread corruption or the bureaucracy is flawed and inefficient. When examining the countries in this category, one finds African countries beset by problems of decolonialisation, but also previously authoritarian or traditional regimes whose old institutions have seized up or disappeared without any other significant institutional solutions taking their place. Furthermore, it barely needs

elections; 2. parliaments elected with free and fair elections; 3. existence of electoral laws and other significant norms, applied correctly; for government functioning: 1. government policies decided by the head of the government and elected parliamentarians; 2. government free from widespread corruption; 3. responsible government that acts openly; for political pluralism and participation: 1. right to organize different parties and the existence of a competitive party system; 2. existence of an opposition and of the concrete possibility for the opposition to build support and win power through elections; 3. freedom from the influence of the armed forces, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies or other powerful groups; 4. protection of cultural, ethnic, religious and other minorities; for freedom of expression and beliefs: 1. free media and freedom of other forms of expression; 2. religious freedom; 3. freedom to teach and an educational system free from widespread indoctrination; 4. freedom of speech; for the freedom of association and organization: 1. guarantee of the rights of free speech, assembly and demonstration; 2. freedom for non-governmental organizations; 3. freedom to form unions, conduct collective bargaining and form professional bodies; for personal autonomy and individual freedoms: 1. absence of state control on travel, residence, occupation and higher education; 2. right to own property and freedom to establish businesses without improper conditioning by the government, security forces, parties, criminal organizations; 3. social freedom, such as gender equality, freedom to marry and freedom regarding family size (government control of births); 4. freedom of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation (see the web site of Freedom House). It should be borne in mind that the rating system here is the 'obvious' one, i.e. a higher score corresponds to the higher presence of the aspect in question, up to 4 points per general indicator. The maximum score for the rule of law is 16, while for electoral process it is 12, and so on.

³⁰ On this point, see also the results of research on the rule of law in the democratization processes of a number of nations close to Europe (Morlino and Magen, "Scope, Depth and Limits of External Influence - Conclusions", in *Anchoring Democracy*, Magen and Morlino (eds.)).

emphasising that the same category includes cases that are quite different, for instance, precisely in terms of the functioning of the state. In fact, the judgement that is made and the consequent attribution of a country to one class rather than another is the result of a relative evaluation: In which ambit does the country under examination show the greatest relative shortcomings? But it is precisely this result that necessarily prompts the question forming the title of the following section.

What kind of stability?

One important issue regarding the regimes analysed here is their presumed constitutive instability. Once some degree of freedom and competition has taken hold, it seems inevitable that the process will continue, even though the direction it will actually take is unknown: it might lead to the establishment of a democracy, but it could also move backwards, with the restoration of the previous authoritarian or other type of regime, or the establishment of a different authoritarian or non-democratic regime. If what is involved is regime transition, its lifespan is uncertain and may last many years. What effectively is the framework that underlies the Freedom House data?

If it is assumed that there is a certain degree of stabilisation after 8-10 years, five hypotheses can be put forward. There could be: 1. stabilisation of the hybrid regime, of whatever kind ('without law', protected, limited democracy); 2. successive stabilisation of a democratic regime which makes it possible to view the previous hybrid regime as a regime in transition towards democracy; 3. successive stabilisation of an authoritarian regime, which makes it possible to view the previous hybrid regime as a regime in transition towards authoritarianism; 4. non-stabilisation, with the regime continuing to be beset with uncertainty stemming from the period in which it was authoritarian; 5. non-stabilisation, with the regime continuing to be beset with uncertainty stemming from the period in which it was democratic.

Table 4: Stabilisation or transition (1991-2006)?

Stabilisation	In transition towards democracy	In transition towards authoritarianism	Uncertainty in an authoritarian context	Uncertainty in a democratic context
Albania	Dominican Republic	Egypt	Afghanistan	Antigua and Barbuda
Armenia	El Salvador	Eritrea	Azerbaijan	Ecuador
Bangladesh	Ghana	Haiti	Burundi	Indonesia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Guyana	Kazakhstan	Central Afr. Rep	Papua New Guinea
Burkina Faso	India	Pakistan	Congo (Brazzaville)	Solomon Islands
Colombia	Lesotho	Tunisia	Cote d'Ivoire	Ukraine
Comoros	Mexico	Zimbabwe (6 years)	Gambia	
Djibouti	Peru		Kenya	
East Timor	Philippines		Kyrgyzstan	
Ethiopia	Romania		Lebanon	
Fiji	Senegal (5anni)		Liberia	
Gabon	South Africa		Mauritania	
Georgia	Taiwan		Nepal	
Guatemala			Russia	
Guinea-Bissau			Thailand	
Honduras			Togo	
Jordan			Yemen	
Kuwait				
Macedonia				
Madagascar				
Malawi				
Malaysia				
Moldova				
Mozambique				
Nicaragua				
Niger				
Nigeria				
Paraguay				
Seychelles				
Sierra Leone				
Singapore				
Sri Lanka				
Tanzania				
Tonga				
Turkey				
Uganda				
Venezuela				
Zambia				

Table 4 was derived from a file that included all the regimes – a total of 87 – classified as partially free, for at least a year between 1991 and 2006. The rules applied for deducing possible stabilisation or otherwise are the ones just described in the text.

Table 4 confirms that hybrid regimes can stabilise as such: either because a kind of 'permanent transition' is set in motion, which in reality is the result of a long stand-off between veto players and democratic elites which results in stalemate or stagnation, in which all the main actors, especially the elites, might even find satisfactory solutions for their concerns, perhaps not ideal but nonetheless viewed pragmatically as the best ones currently available; or, as in the case of protected democracies, because a dominant power, or even a

coalition, keeps the regime in a kind of intermediate limbo; or, finally, due to the lack of any central, governing institution. While the last of the five hypotheses seems the least probable, the category of stabilised hybrid regimes is the largest, as can be seen from the first column of Table 4. It is also the one in which it is possible to find cases where, for the whole duration of the period considered, namely fifteen years (1991-2006), there is a stability which seems to have frozen the internal dynamics of institutions: if there is

some degree of competition and freedom, there is also impetus towards greater democracy, but this impetus is blocked for at least one of the reasons mentioned above.

The other four categories are also significant, revealing two findings in particular. Firstly, columns two and three show that, with hindsight, the listed hybrid regimes did not stabilise as such, but that the institutional dynamics already existing within them got the upper hand, either in an authoritarian or in a democratic sense. Secondly, the fourth and fifth columns reveal the existence of cases where stabilisation has not occurred, at least according to the available data. The majority of these have an authoritarian legacy which is hard to ignore, possibly due to the existence of veto players who are keeping the nation concerned far away from democracy.

might be made relates to the potentially strong role of governments and international organisations in helping to build state institutions, even prior to establishing democracies, in countries that have manifested a strong incapacity in this respect over the years and which, as has been seen, are both numerous and important in the international framework.

Concluding remarks

The analysis above has ended up moving in a different direction to the one considered in recent literature, and is more in line with that taken in older, more traditional literature, such as work carried out in the 1950s on developing countries and their instability. The debate on democratisation has led to neglect of this issue, even though it is highly evident at an empirical level: the most significant problem in terms of specific cases is to ensure the existence of institutions more or less capable of performing their functions. This theme has already been discussed by other authors, for instance Fukuyama,³¹ and is still the central issue deserving attention. A second concluding remark concerns the need to produce classifications with a more powerful explanatory potential than the ones advanced here. However, this can only be achieved with in-depth knowledge, which is not easy to acquire without substantial means and a carefully designed methodology. The third and last consideration which

³¹ Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press, 2004

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In recent times, growing interest in democratisation and the development of associated research has aroused considerable interest in the more specific theme of the spread of hybrid or 'transitional' regimes. This Working Paper outlines the quantitative terms of democratisation; pinpoints the pertinent analytic dimensions, starting with definitions of the terms 'regime', 'authoritarianism' and 'democracy'; defines a 'hybrid regime'; proposes a typology of hybrid regimes; and, finally, tries to answer the key question posed in the title. As becomes clear, this question is not only closely bound up with prospects for change in the nations that have such ambiguous forms of political organisation, but also, more generally, with the spread of democratisation. The main findings of the Working Paper point to the need to ensure the existence of institutions largely capable of performing their functions, and to the potentially strong role of governments and international organisations in helping to build state institutions, even prior to the establishment of democracies.

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