How Hamas Won – Israel’s Tactical Success and Strategic Failure

Asimismo, Hamás se ha visto reforzada a nivel político. El mismo hecho de que se hayan disparado más de 1.200 cohetes sobre toda la geografía de Israel ha levantado la moral de un sinnúmero de palestinos que quieren justicia y que no la obtienen por la inacción de la comunidad internacional.

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No matter how and when the conflict between Hamas and Israel ends, two things are certain. The first is that Israel will be able to claim a tactical victory. The second is that it will have suffered a strategic defeat.

At the tactical level, the success of the Iron Dome missile defense system has kept Israeli casualties near zero and significantly reduced the material damage from the rockets fired from Gaza. Israel’s ground invasion, launched on Thursday, will also reap rewards. Indeed, it already has: Israeli forces have exposed and destroyed several Hamas tunnels, including some that were intended to allow cross-border activity into Israel and others that facilitated the movement of goods, ammunition, and militants within Gaza itself.

Such tactical achievements should not be minimized. But they do not equal a strategic victory. War, as Clausewitz famously taught, is the continuation of politics by other means. Wars are fought to realign politics in a way that benefits the victor and is detrimental to the loser. But the Israelis have lost sight of this distinction.

In fact, Israel has a history of claiming victory when in fact it has suffered defeat; the October 1973 war is the best example. Israel claimed that it had won because its forces ended their war on the western side of the Suez Canal with Egyptian forces partially encircled behind them. The reality is that Egypt achieved the strategic victory. All along, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s objective was to seize and hold some territory in order to dislodge stuck political negotiations and, ultimately, recover the occupied Sinai Peninsula for Egypt. Sadat got what he wanted.

Israelis might believe that, even though they are not likely to see a political realignment at the end of this war, at least Hamas won’t have achieved its own strategic objectives. The absence of large numbers of Israeli fatalities, the thinking goes, is a mark of Hamas’ failure. But Israelis are wrong there, too. Killing large numbers of Israelis would be a treat for Hamas, but it is not vital to the group’s definition of strategic success.

Hamas’ strategic objective is to shatter Israel’s sense of normalcy. It is only possible for Israel to exist as a flourishing and prosperous democracy under the garrisoned conditions of persistent conflict when its citizens are able to maintain the illusion that their lives are more or less similar to what they would aspire to have in London, Paris, or New York. With that illusion destroyed, several outcomes are possible, none of which are good for Israel. Despairing of the possibility of peace, small numbers of Israeli Jews may decide to emigrate. More likely is that disagreements over how to handle the Palestinian problem will deepen, sowing discord within Israeli society and undermining the core Israeli narrative based on the justice of Zionism. Cohesion around that narrative has been a key motivating force for making the sacrifices and facing the dangers that life in Israel often entails, including the long, compulsory military service that is a fact of life for most Israeli Jews. Although these internal fissures will not bring Israel to its knees, any erosion of Israeli power — including the power of the population’s will — is a win for Hamas.

Israel has long been eager to thwart the expansion of the influence of Islamist resistance organizations that they see as determinedly more implacable foes. Consider that the first Intifada, from 1987­ to 1993, led to the weakening of the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and to the rise of dangerous and militant organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The threat of these Islamist organizations motivated Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres to bolster the failing fortunes of PLO leader Yasir Arafat and embark on the Oslo peace process, which, had it succeeded, would have been a dead end for Hamas.

Indeed it was the violence of the second Intifada, which destroyed nearly 1,000 Israeli lives between 2001 and 2004 through wave upon wave of suicide attacks in the heart of Israel’s major cities, which caused Israeli citizens’ confidence to buckle and ultimately persuaded them to support a unilateral withdrawal of citizens and settlements from Gaza. They hoped the move would appease Palestinian wrath. It did not.

The persistent, low level rocketing of Israel’s southern cities since Israel withdrew from Gaza has not caused enough disruption in the rest of Israel to bring Hamas any strategic benefits. In other words, Hamas’ attacks on the border cities have not stopped most Israelis from going about their daily business in near-total obliviousness to the political and humanitarian condition of the Palestinians in Gaza.

This new round of violence, on the other hand, has caused enormous disruption. Rockets fired from Gaza have triggered warning sirens in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Beer Sheva — all of Israel’s major cities — and points in between as well. Those rockets haven’t killed any people thus far, but they have sent almost everyone scrambling for shelter several times a day and shattered the illusion that what happens “there” does not affect life “here.”

That would be enough for Hamas to declare victory. But the group has been racking up additional strategic benefits as well. First, the disproportionate number of casualties in Israel and Gaza has made Israel appear, at least to many Western eyes, as the aggressor, even though Hamas shot first this time around. Second, the Iron Dome has made covering the story within Israel boring for outside journalists. “Rocket goes off, rocket gets intercepted, life goes on” is not an exciting story. Israel’s retaliations, which level Gaza’s unreinforced buildings and leave behind mangled bodies, sell more newspapers. And so, the world has focused on Gaza. Israel’s friends may bemoan that as unfair — Israel is being punished for successfully defending its citizens, while Hamas leaves its own vulnerable. But that misses the point. War is not an exercise in fairness, but in the attainment of strategic objectives.

And, on that score, Hamas has already won. It has shattered the necessary illusion for Israelis that a political stalemate with the Palestinians is cost-free for Israel. It has shown Israelis that, even if the Palestinians cannot kill them, they can extract a heavy psychological price. It has also raised the profile of the Palestinian cause and reinforced the perception that the Palestinians are weak victims standing against a powerful aggressor. Down the road, that feeling is sure to be translated into pressure on Israel, perhaps by politicians and certainly by social movements whose objective is to isolate Israel politically and damage it through economic boycotts.

There are still those who will fantasize that this defeat will come with the same silver lining as Israel’s loss in 1973. Although Sadat’s attacks on Israelis in the Sinai shattered the feeling of invincibility that Israelis had nurtured since the end of the 1967 war, the war at least resulted in the Camp David accords and a durable, if cold, peace that has underwritten Israel’s regional security since the late 1970s. Perhaps Hamas’ strategic victory in this conflict will yield similar dividends for Israel down the road. However, such an outcome seems quite unlikely. Sadat had concrete objectives, namely the re-opening of the Suez Canal and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt — objectives that were reconcilable with Israel’s own needs. Hamas, on the other hand, calls for Israel’s elimination, an objective that leaves scant room for negotiation.

In the end, this round will go to the Palestinians, as did the previous major round of fighting in 2008. Focusing on tactical success should not blind Israel to the dangers it faces from these repeated strategic defeats. There is not much that Israel can do to change Hamas’ behavior. What it must do, however, to prevent Hamas from capitalizing on its strategic success is to remind contemporary Israelis of what their early leaders knew all too well. As Moshe Dayan, an Israeli army chief of staff and later defense minister, said, ‘‘We know that in order for their [the Arab] hope of annihilating us to die away, it is incumbent on us — morning and night — to be armed and ready.” The challenge for Israel is to maintain that state of readiness while at the same time making the humane and appropriate choices that ensure its security, enhance Israel’s attractiveness as a strategic and commercial partner for Western nations, and maintain its internal social cohesion over the long haul. This trifecta may seem impossible, but the first 19 years of Israel’s national existence suggest otherwise.

En: foreignaffairs

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Hamas e Israel en la peor escalada desde finales de 2012

Mueren al menos once milicianos -seis de ellos de Hamas- y un niño de siete años. Las principales milicias de la Franja de Gaza han disparado 70 proyectiles y misiles. Israel ha ordenado intensificar los ataques aéreos contra grupos islamistas en Gaza.

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Israel y el grupo islamista Hamas han entrado en la escalada más grave desde finales de noviembre del 2012. El brazo armado del grupo que controla la Franja de Gaza disparó en la tarde y noche de este lunes más de 200 proyectiles y misiles contra localidades israelíes situadas a decenas de kilómetros provocando un par de heridos leves.

Tras este ataque palestino, el más masivo de Hamas desde el 2012, Israel ha iniciado una intensa ofensiva aérea contra decenas de objetivos de los grupos islamistas en Gaza. No se trata de ataques puntuales sino el inicio de la operación llamada ‘Protective Edge”, que hasta ahora ha causado la muerte a once milicianos -seis de ellos de Hamas- y a un niño de siete años, y heridas a 25 personas más, en su mayoría civiles. Poco después, caían de nuevo varios cohetes en el sur de Israel.

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Además, al menos nueve civiles resultaron heridos en los bombardeos de la aviación israelí contra casas de militantes de los movimientos islamistas, informaron fuentes médicas que cita Efe. Según Asraf al Qedra, portavoz de Emergencias en la Franja, los nueve civiles estaban en una vivienda de la zona de este de la ciudad meridional de Jan Yunis, y hubieron de ser tratados en un hospital de la zona.

“No hay lugar ahora hablar de tregua”, avisaba anoche un portavoz de Hamas mientras en Israel respondían: “Hamas ha preferido guerra a calma”. Los habitantes de la paupérrima Gaza y del sur de Israel temen lo peor.

Ante la posibilidad de una inminente escalada, el Ejército israelí ha desplegado varias brigadas en las zonas fronterizas de la Franja y ha movilizado a 1500 reservistas. En su gran mayoría, pertenecen a la Unidad de Protección Civil dedicada a los habitantes de las ciudades bajo los ataques de proyectiles y las baterías defensivas Cúpula de Hierro.

Por un lado, los portavoces de Hamas responsabilizan a Israel y afirman que este lunes han respondido a la muerte de siete miembros del brazo armado en la última noche. “Es una grave escalada y el enemigo lo pagará muy caro. No queremos una guerra pero si nos la imponen, estamos preparados”, advirtió el portavoz de Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri.

Por otro, fuentes militares israelíes avisan: “Tras los más de 200 proyectiles contra el sur de Israel desde el secuestro y asesinato de los tres adolescentes el pasado 12 de junio y dado que pese al ultimátum del jueves, Hamas sigue disparando de forma incesante, estamos preparados para una escalada”. “La escalada será respondida con escalada”, advierte el oficial Mordejai adelantando una contundente respuesta militar.

Además, este lunes las “Brigadas Izadim Al Qasem”, brazo armado del movimiento islamista Hamas han admitido que han disparado “decenas de proyectiles” contra tres localidades del sur y el centro de Israel. En un comunicado, la milicia aseguró que ha lanzado “decenas de proyectiles contra las localidades de Asdod, Ashkelo y Netivot en respuesta a la agresión sionista”.

Por primera vez desde la ofensiva Pilar Defensivo a finales del 2012, Hamas asume la autoría de decenas de proyectiles contra las ciudades israelíes. Una prueba de que ha optado por la escalada ya que era consciente de que el disparo y posterior autoría tendrán una dura respuesta israelí.

En la pugna interna entre el brazo armado y el liderazgo político de Hamas, ha vencido el primero.

Ante la ausencia del mediador egipcio, las dos partes parecen condenadas a un nuevo conflicto bélico.

En: elmundo.es

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Israel moviliza reservistas y Hamas lanza más misiles

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El movimiento islámico Hamas continuó ayer sus ataques con cohetes desde Gaza contra Israel, que amenazan con desembocar en una crisis abierta. Como respuesta, Tel Aviv movilizó unos 1.500 reservistas para una eventual intervención. La nueva ofensiva palestina ocurrió apenas unas horas después de que tres extremistas judíos confesaran haber quemado vivo a un joven palestino secuestrado.

“Los cohetes son una reacción natural a los crímenes israelíes contra nuestro pueblo. Que el ocupante (por Israel) comprenda bien el mensaje. No tememos sus amenazas”, advirtió el portavoz del Hamas en Gaza, Sami Abu Zuhri. El grupo se adjudicó un ataque por primera vez en esta crisis.

Fuentes del ejército israelí denunciaron que más de 40 cohetes se lanzaron desde Gaza en una sola hora, de los cuales su sistema de defensa antimisiles destruyó 12 en vuelo en el sur del país.

La aviación israelí respondió poco después a esos disparos con treinta ataques aéreos contra el sur de este enclave palestino, al este de Rafah, sin causar víctimas, según los servicios de seguridad del movimiento islamista.

Por otra parte, la televisión israelí indicó que el gabinete de seguridad de Israel había autorizado al ejército “intensificar las represalias contra el Hamas”.

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Horas antes de los disparos de cohetes hacia Israel y los bombardeos israelíes en Gaza, una fuente cercana a la investigación del joven palestino asesinado informó que tres de los seis sospechosos detenidos por el crimen confesaron haberlo matado y quemado.

Mohamed Abu Jdeir, de 16 años, fue secuestrado el 2 de julio en Jerusalén Este, la parte de la ciudad ocupada y anexada por Israel. Su cadáver, que estaba totalmente calcinado, según el abogado de la familia, fue hallado horas después en la parte occidental de la ciudad.

Tras este hallazgo, palestinos habían acusado a ultraderechistas judíos de haberlo secuestrado y matado para vengarse del secuestro y el asesinato de tres estudiantes israelíes en la región de Hebrón, en la Cisjordania ocupada.

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En el plano político, la ultraderecha radical de Israel, liderada por el canciller Avigdor Lieberman, anunció que rompió el pacto electoral con el Likud del premier Benyamin Netanyahu.

Una de las diferencias que planteó Lieberman con el oficialismo concierne a la actitud de Israel hacia Hamas en Gaza, que según Lieberman debería ser mucho más dura. Otro elemento de discordia, precisó, se refiere a la radicalización de la minoría árabe en Israel.

En este momento, el Likud cuenta con 20 diputados en el Parlamento, Lieberman 11. El partido Futuro, el segundo en cantidad de ediles, 19. Por eso es imprescindible contar con los sectores radicalizados. Por eso no deberá sorprender si Netanyahu comienza a endurecer su política respecto de los palestinos para que no se le quiebre el frente interno.

En: clarin

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